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Introduction  
The twin policy domains of accountability and autonomy have featured in recent education 
reforms in many countries, signalling new relationships between governments and 
educational institutions. Despite different national and localised contexts, a number of 
common ‘global’ trends have been identified in these policy domains. However, 
simultaneously context-specific differences are also evident. Our research is located within 
the tensions between global commonalities and localised differences in educational 
policies and practices. 
This paper reports an ongoing research project on changing accountability and 
autonomy in higher education in three ‘Asian’ countries. Empirical data has been collected 
in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong (HK) and Singapore. After analysis of 
national policy documents, two different types of universities (‘old/traditional’ and 
‘new/technological’) became case study sites in each country for the analysis of both 
commonalities and differences in accountability and autonomy policies and practices.  
The paper is divided into 5 sections. First, the phenomenon of globalisation which 
forms a conceptual framework for the study is problematised. Second, the contextual 
background for the study is presented in the form of a brief overview of changing 
accountability and autonomy policies in the three countries, as reported in the literature. 
Third, the methodological framings for the study are explicated. The fourth section of the 
paper provides a preliminary window into one part of the data collected through 
interviews in China – accountability policies and practices – as reported by respondents 
in two case study universities to offer a small ‘taste’ of empirical findings. The fifth and final 
section points, tentatively, to some of the key issues to emerge from the data, although it 
must be emphasised that this is a tentative discussion rather than a conclusion at this 
point, given that the project as a whole incorporates much more data from PRC, HK and 
Singapore, providing the basis for more extensive comparisons and contrasts.  
 
A conceptual framing: globalisation  
It is increasingly difficult to understand education policies and practices without reference 
to globalisation processes (Crossley, 2000). The concept of globalisation is complex and 
contested and often contradictory, but most usually it refers to the greater 
interconnectedness of the world, “to flows of people and services, both globally and 
locally” (Eggins, 2003, p1). Many commentators distinguish three principal forms of 
globalisation – economic, political and cultural (eg Olssen et al., 2004) whereas others 
such as Bottery (2000) have identified other forms as well, including demographic, 
managerial and environmental globalisation.  
Two main approaches to the concept of globalisation can be distinguished. The first, 
politically neutral, approach defines globalisation as an empirical reality in terms of the 
compression of time and space (e.g. Robertson, 1995), or as Castells (2000) has referred 
to it ‘space of flows’ and ‘timeless time’, particularly associated with instantaneous 
communications technology. The second approach identifies globalisation more as an 
economic discourse which actively promulgates a market ideology, and results from 
policies of neo-liberal governmentality (Olssen et al, 2004). Thus, globalisation can be 
seen to have both technical and ideological dimensions. The increasing impact of 
supranational organisations, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
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regulators), as well as the emergence of a ‘global policy community’ (Henry et al., 2001), 
are also relevant in understanding globalising processes.  
There are some commentators who argue that globalisation seriously threatens the 
legitimacy of the nation-state and weakens its power to set its own policy directions, and 
others who argue that the impact of globalisation on the integrity of the nation-state has 
been significantly over-estimated. Further, there are some who argue that with 
globalisation, pressures towards homogeneity (policy convergences) prevail and others 
who argue that heterogeneity (policy divergences) still predominate across and within 
different nation-states. Bottery (2000) takes a position that while nation-states do continue 
to exert their influences in a globalising world, there has been a noticeable loss of power 
for national governments in the face of supra-national forces. He also argues that both 
convergences and divergences in national and local policies and practices are 
simultaneously evident with globalisation, especially as different countries have different 
histories and change at different rates. In terms of the impact of globalisation on economic 
and social inequalities, Bottery (2000) cites Brecher in implicating globalisation in ‘a race to 
the bottom’, as they argue that it exacerbates such inequalities both between and within 
nation-states, while others have argued that globalisaton also brings the potential for 
greater harmonisation (e.g. Eggins, 2003). We take a similar position to that of Bottery, 
underscoring the complexities of globalisation as it plays out in different ways at different 
times and in different places, and we are particularly interested in power differentials 
created and entrenched by globalisation.  
To focus now more specifically on higher education, the advent of a ‘global knowledge 
economy’ has brought universities, as key producers and disseminators of knowledge, 
onto centre stage in public policy making agendas. Naidoo (2003) argues that 
governments have reconfigured universities as a ‘global commodity’, restructuring them to 
be more responsive to both government intervention and market forces to enhance 
national economic positioning in the global arena. While it could be argued that universities 
have always been ‘international’ in character (see Porter and Vidovich, 2000), there has 
been a significant upturn in flows of people and services beyond national borders. 
Marginson (2003, p. 18) associates  globalisation in higher education with “cross-border 
communities, cross-border flows of people (staff and students, which … includes fee 
paying international students); cross border flows of research and knowledge; cross border 
flows of money in international educational trade; and inter-country and inter-institutional 
collaborations, negotiation and recognition protocols in many areas”.  
Referring specifically, again, to higher education, Marginson and Rhoades (2002) offer 
a useful conceptual framing for the dynamic interrelationships between global, national 
and local levels, which they refer to as a ‘glo-na-cal agency heruistic’. They do not see 
global phenomena as universalistic or determinist, and so they continue to emphasise the 
relevance of national and local dimensions. For them, the ‘agency’ in ‘glonacal agency’ 
can mean either an organization, or the ability of people individually and collectively to take 
action. They highlight that both forms of agency can apply to global, national and local 
levels. In fact, we would suggest that ‘agency’ might potentially be exerted continuously at 
all points between these three main levels, with for example, regional levels (between 
global and national levels, such as the European Union and Asia-Pacific region) becoming 
increasingly important in policy arenas. The ‘glonacal agency heuristic’ identifies different 
dimensions of influence of organisational agencies and collective human action: 
‘reciprocity’, ‘strength’ ‘layers and conditions’ and ‘spheres’. Reciprocity refers to the notion 
that influences flow in more than one direction, suggesting two-way exchanges between all 
levels in the ‘glonacal’. Strength indicates the magnitude and directness of influence, in 
addition to resources at the disposal of agencies and agents. Layers and conditions refers 
to resilient historical structures and practices of institutions, systems and countries that 
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(geographical and functional) of agents and agency. This heuristic, then, represents 
globalisation in a far more complex and dynamic way than simply as an omnipresent top-
down pressure on nation-states and institutions. There is also a strong potential to tease 
out the finer nuances of power relationships with such a conceptual tool. In this study, we 
wish to emphasise such complex and dynamic interrelationships in globalising processes. 
(See Vidovich (2004) for an application of Marginson and Rhoades’ glonacal agency 
heuristic to ‘quality’ policy processes in Australian higher education). 
Although Scott (2000) has emphasised that globalisation is the most fundamental 
challenge facing universities in their history, we would argue that the precise nature of 
these challenges will not be uniform across, or even within, different countries. Our 
exploration of globalisation is situated within specific countries and specific universities in 
the early 2000s. The PRC, HK and Singapore are the starting points for our investigations 
on globalisation processes in ‘Asian’ universities to begin to redress a ‘Western’ hegemony 
in this field. However, there is no intention to homogenise the vast array of higher 
education policies and practices in the region under the label of ‘Asian’, or to extrapolate 
the findings from this study to other countries in the region or to make crude comparisons 
with ‘Western’ countries en bloc. One major problem of the existing literature is the 
tendency for arguments about globalisation to be based on sweeping generalisations and 
abstract theoretical assertions insufficiently connected to specific historical examples and 
evidence (Yang, 2002). There are still too few studies on the implications of globalisation 
processes grounded in detailed examinations of particular historical times and 
geographical spaces. Empirical comparative studies in newly developing countries are 
especially lacking. Furthermore, many ‘Asian’ countries are actively competing for 
leadership in the evolving global knowledge economy, and it is therefore timely to turn up 
the research focus on education policies and practices within countries of this region. Just 
as Latin American scholarship has contributed dependency theory and Freirean notions of 
education for critical consciousness and liberation, the literature of Asia (and Africa) will 
help offset the hegemony of European and North American scholarship (Arnove, 1999; 
Masemann, 1997). The ‘West’ may also reach a situation faced by Japan and China in the 
19
th century where it too will need to broaden its focus to increasingly encompass 
scholarship from other parts of the world (Hayhoe, 1997). Thus, this study aims to make a 
contribution to redressing some of this global research imbalance. 
 
Contextual framings in PRC, HK and Singapore 
Singapore and HK, in particular, are vying to be educational hubs in the Asia-Pacific region 
and the two governments have initiated policies to redefine the functions of their 
universities, introducing quality assurance mechanisms, diversifying funding sources, and 
reforming university governance systems (Lee, 2001). With its entrance into the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), PRC has significantly increased it position internationally as a 
socio-economic and geopolitical force, as it has shifted from its isolationist, politics-
oriented policies to open door, economic-oriented policies. This change was accompanied 
by major reforms in higher education, which were ascribed as occupying a key supporting 
role in the drive to modernise the nation (Agelasto and Adamson, 1998).  
In all three countries, there is a desire to be competitive internationally and to look to 
the policies of other countries to determine the best way to develop ‘world class’ 
universities. To achieve this, the governments in each county have adopted policies of 
decentralisation to allow more autonomy and flexibility to universities to induce greater 
creativity; however at the same time, they have introduced controls and regulations 
through accountability. One mechanism for introducing greater autonomy was to introduce 
block funding and triennial budgets (1996 in HK and 2000 in Singapore) and then to 
strengthen their performance reviews and incentive funding in an attempt to make their 
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recentralisation suggest that governments are in the process of re-establishing control so 
that instead of a genuine policy of decentralisation, a number of commentators consider 
the policies to be ‘centralised decentralisation’ (Mok, 2000; Lee, 2001) or as others have 
described these policies in OECD countries as ‘steering at a distance’ (Kickert, 1991) or 
‘self-regulation’ (Neave and Van Vught, 1991). According to Mok and Lee (2002), the HK 
government’s control of universities has actually been strengthened instead of weakened. 
Mok (2001) makes a similar observation about Singapore when suggesting that giving 
universities autonomy has not necessarily meant the state’s control and regulation has 
been reduced as “the introduction of stringent measures to hold universities accountable to 
the public and the implementation of various kinds of quality assurance activities in 
Singapore’s universities are clear indicators of recentralisation” (2001, p. 10). In China this 
phenomenon has been described as a ‘deregulated state model’ or an ‘interventionist state 
model’, meaning the central government maintains a relatively tight control over higher 
education policies (Hawkins, 1999) but also introduces market mechanisms to reduce the 
burden of financing higher education alone (Kooiman, 2000). Overall, though, government 
capacity to control higher education through accountability actually grows.  
There is a strong state in the three countries under investigation: Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and the PRC. However, the impact of globalisation may have altered the state into a 
more ‘competitive state’ and led to the introduction of market forces into public sector 
management. All three countries have drawn on the rhetoric and practices of new public 
management to deliver their accountability policies. As PRC was the first to introduce such 
policies, we start with its reforms, and then turn to those of Hong Kong and Singapore.  
 
China 
Chinese universities are under great pressure from the central government to adopt 
finance-driven reforms, emphasising decentralisation, privatisation and better performance 
(Carnoy, 2000), although some observers have argued that this pressure has undermined 
some of the best of its traditions (eg Liu, 1998). The economistic rhetoric of individual 
rights and ideologies of efficiency are fast gaining momentum in China (Kwong, 1997). 
Strong market forces and the ideas of corporate management have affected the way 
universities operate in China. With heavy weight being attached to the principles of 
efficiency and quality in higher education, Chinese universities are subjected to 
unprecedented external scrutiny. Concerns for value for money and public accountability 
have dominated policies. Within a context of entrepreneurial efficiency and effectiveness, 
Chinese universities are under immense pressures to generate revenue. Adding revenue 
generation as the ‘third responsibility’ in addition to teaching and research has become an 
important mission of many Chinese universities from the most prestigious, city-based 
ones, such as Beijing and Tsinghua universities, to the provincial ones. As the Chinese 
government moved towards greater delegation of power to its universities, it began to 
attach greater importance to ‘social supervision’ as a way of ensuring the quality of higher 
education in the longer term (Xu, Qi & Wang, 2001). 
Chinese universities are increasingly required by the state and the public to be 
responsive to the market-oriented economy. China started to adopt reform policies of 
decentralisation in the mid-1980s. The promulgation of the Decision of Reform of 
Educational System by the Chinese Communist Party in 1985 marks the first 
comprehensive reform in Chinese higher education sector. It put emphasis on local 
responsibility, diversity of educational opportunities, multiple sources of educational funds, 
and decentralisation of power to individual institutions’ authorities in governing their own 
affairs. 
Along this line, the Outlines of Reform and Development of Chinese Education issued 
by the State Council and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1993 
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role of macro-manager through legislation, allocation of funding, planning, information 
service, policy guidance and essential administration, while universities independently 
provide education geared to the needs of society under the supervision of the government. 
By the late 1990s, through implementing a series of policies of decentralisation and 
maketisation, the Chinese government had initiated fundamental changes in the 
orientation, financing, curriculum, and management of higher education (Agelasto & 
Adamson, 1998). Through donations and loans, some supra-national agencies began 
playing an increasingly prominent role in promoting this market ideology. The influence of 
the World Bank’s financial power has led to its strategic collaboration with the central 
government (Drake, 2001). The OECD has had less direct institutionalised involvement in 
working with the Chinese government but it nonetheless an important influence on its 
higher education policies. The WTO’s potential effect is yet to be realised (Robertson, 
Bonal & Dale, 2002) but again is a significant operator in China’s economic reforms and 
consequently these reforms are likely to affect universities. 
In China, the ‘interventionist state model’ is exemplified by the current policy push for 
university mergers (Yang, 2000). One major goal was to achieve economic benefits with 
an assumption that larger units, based on economies of scale, would yield qualitatively 
stronger academic institutions, better management and more cost-effective use of 
administrative resources. It was not surprising, then, that the primary impetus came from 
the government with specific policies emphasising efficiency in running higher education 
(Sanyal, 1995). This echoes the situation in many other parts of the world (Harman & 
Meek, 2002), where mergers could be understood as a way to enhance the research and 
teaching performance of universities and as a means to reduce public expenditure.  
 
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong is less state-centric in its approach to economic and social change than either 
Singapore or China, having embraced a more free-enterprise approach. However, there is 
concern expressed, for example in the protests against Article 23 in 2003, that the state is 
becoming more interventionist since the hand-over to China in 1997. In terms of higher 
education policy, the University Grants Commission (UGC) was established in 1965 as an 
intermediary between the government and the universities so the government has less 
direct control over higher education policies. Nevertheless, with the introduction of its 
quality assurance processes more control is being reinserted into the higher education 
system by the UGC. 
Hong Kong began its quality assurance processes with its Research Assessment 
Exercise, RAE, (1993, 1996 and 1999); then its Teaching and Learning Quality Process 
Review, TLQPR, (1995 and 2001); and finally its Management Review (1999). The RAE 
was an assessment of the quantity of articles published in international peer-reviewed 
journals and determined the proportion of active researchers in terms of departments and 
then the institutions as a whole instead of individuals. The TLQPR was not an assessment 
per se but rather a quality process review that did not evaluate quality itself but focused on 
the processes that are believed to produce quality (Massy, 1997). The Management 
Review examined management practices in the development of strategic plans, resource 
application, service delivery and information systems. Based on the Principles of Good 
Management Practice (University Grants Commission Secretariat, 1999), it identified 
practices that it wanted universities to implement.  
Hong Kong introduced harsher accountability measures from the beginning with its 
RAE and more recently its Management Review that have drawn considerable criticism 
from academics. Mok and Lee (2002) note that the government’s role in the control of 
education was strengthened instead of weakened as a result of the RAE exercises and the 
Management Review. They noted that “the UGC has been criticised for imposing an ethos 
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severely the traditional and sacrosanct ideals of academic freedom and institutional 
autonomy” (p. 228). In particular, they concluded that “the UGC’s Management Review 
has been perceived as a landmark for an external gatekeeping body to intervene crudely 
in the governance of local universities” (p. 229).  
By introducing certain external reviews, this puts pressure on universities to change 
their internal procedures to be more in line with the outputs and principles recognised by 
the external reviewers. Thus, a ‘publish or perish’ phenomenon has become the norm in 
Hong Kong universities as a result of the RAE, linking research output to appointments, 
promotions, substantiations (tenure) and extensions beyond retirement (Cheng, 2002). 
 
Singapore 
Singapore is a particularly good example of how a government can manipulate 
globalisation forces to justify its own local political agendas (Mok and Lee, 2001). It also 
shows how local, national and global processes are dynamically intertwined. Singapore 
has been described as a government-made society (Low, 1998) that uses a variety of 
economic, political and social tools to achieve its national goals. It is proactive in its higher 
education policies, attempting to ‘remake the nation’ into an innovative and creative 
society. There is a lot of emphasis on thinking globally and adopting an enterprising spirit 
at the same time that the government wants its citizens to remain rooted in Singapore and 
committed to national goals. As early as 1996, Gopinathan predicted that Singapore’s 
state-centric approach to social change would interact with globalisation in a distinct way. 
He suggested, “Even as educational paradigms and ideas take on a global character, the 
factors that determine educational policies are essentially national in character” (1996, p. 
18).  
Singapore initially allowed its universities to introduce their own internal quality 
processes. These were quite effective in developing more stringent tenure policies, 
rewards for teaching and incentives for good research performance and staff training to 
upgrade skills (Lee and Gopinathan, 2002). Then it began to be more interventionist by 
introducing performance based remuneration in 2000, international benchmarking in 2001, 
and allocated funds according to results to universities in 2003.  
The introduction of public sector reforms began in 1995 in Singapore. As the two public 
universities are run as statutory boards by the government, they have to comply with 
Public Service for the 21
st Century. The core values this policy are cost effectiveness, 
efficiency, productivity, and quality customer service. Even though Singapore has been 
described as an interventionist government, it has only recently introduced accountability 
measures that are linked to funding allocations. It preferred earlier to allow universities to 
develop their own quality assurance processes.  
The two public Singaporean universities have introduced an appraisal system in the 
areas of teaching, research and administration. This was linked with performance-based 
pay in 2001 and universities had their research results linked to funding during 2003. Thus, 
Singapore’s government is moving in the direction of Hong Kong and adding external 
monitoring to its internal quality processes. External reviews will be held every three years 
after the initial one in 2001.  
Another way that Singaporean universities have tried to increase their research 
reputations is to recruit talented local and overseas academics. So besides trying to 
change the internal culture to be more innovative by providing staff training to upgrade 
skills, they have mainly brought in talent from outside to boost their research profiles. The 
Singaporean government has also encouraged the collaboration of local institutions with 
overseas institutions. In Singapore, the Economic Development Board is in charge of 
attracting world class universities from overseas to establish their outposts in Singapore. 
They set the target of attracting ten universities into Singapore by 2008 to make the city-
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Hopkins, Wharton, Chicago Graduate Schools, Georgia Institute of Technology, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology – thereby actively bringing global influences directly 
into Singapore.  
 
Methodological framings 
In this study, policy is viewed broadly, consistent with a definition as "both text and action, 
words and deeds, it is what is enacted as well as what is intended" (Ball, 1994, p. 10). 
Policy is increasingly seen as a process in which there is extensive negotiation, resistance 
and transformation of the original intent as it plays out in everyday life. Policy analysis 
should then include examination of factors influencing the production of the policy text, the 
text itself, ongoing negotiation and changes to the text, and the resultant effects and 
consequences (Taylor et al., 1997). This broad approach means that policy is to be found 
everywhere, and not just at the macro level of central government (Ozga, 2000), and 
therefore the perspectives of practitioners at the micro level within individual institutions 
become integral to fully understanding education policy processes.  
Recently, policy studies have focused on the tensions between the degree of 
constraint placed on the whole policy process from the macro level, on the one hand, and 
the degree of ‘free’ agency of individual practitioners to ‘remake’ policy at the micro level, 
on the other hand. The approach taken in this study is to move beyond this dichotomy and 
to track policy on accountability and autonomy in higher education from global contexts 
(macro level), through national level policies in Singapore, HK and PRC, to policy 
reconstruction and practices within individual higher education institutions (micro level) in 
those countries. The emphasis is on the dynamic interactions between macro constraint 
and micro agency, and the way the inherent tensions play out within particular universities 
(see Vidovich, 2002).   
The theoretical framework adopted in this research is an hybrid. It revolves around 
interpretivist theory (micro level focus); critical theory (macro level focus); and the concept 
of a ‘policy cycle’ (which can link micro and macro levels).  Interpretivist theory is relevant 
for its micro-sociological focus within individual universities. It is based on a belief that 
social actors construct a world of lived reality by attaching specific meanings to local 
situations. “It looks for culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of the 
social life-world” (Crotty 1998, p. 67). Interpretivists believe that knowledge is always local 
and embedded in organisational sites. For the ‘bigger picture’ at state/national and global 
levels, critical theory offers valuable analytic insights. Critical theory is about unearthing 
changing power relationships with a view to offering voice to ‘the unheard’ and challenging 
inequalities (Crotty, 1998). 
This study achieves coherence by conceptualising policy processes associated with 
accountability and autonomy in the form of continuous cycles. The use of the concept of a 
‘policy cycle’ (Ball, 1994) can link macro and micro levels of policy processes. According to 
this conceptual framework, a number of different contexts of the policy process are 
distinguished for analytic purposes: ‘influences,’ ‘policy text production,’ ‘effects/ 
consequences,’ and ‘outcomes’ (Ball, 1994; Taylor et al., 1997). The context of influence is 
where interest groups struggle over the construction of policy discourses; the context of 
policy text production focuses on the who, how and what of the policy text as it is being 
produced; the context of effects/consequences is where policy is subject to multiple 
interpretations by practitioners; and finally the context of outcomes examines the macro-
level effects of policies, especially in relation to changing power relationships between the 
different institutions of society. 
In analysing accountability and autonomy policy processes in PRC, HK and Singapore, 
a case study approach is highlighted to gain an in-depth understanding of the relevant 
policy processes from within individual universities in their unique settings. Each of the six 
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because it allows detailed data to be collected at a single site, thereby enabling the 
researcher to gain an understanding of the complexities of that particular site (Coffey and 
Atkinson, 1996) and to preserve a sense of the ‘wholeness’ of the site being investigated 
(Punch, 1998). Although different types of universities in each country will be represented, 
there is no intention to claim generalisability of findings to all universities in these 
countries. However, readers are invited to reflect on the themes emerging from the case 
studies and to make their own judgments about potential transferability to their own 
context (Walford, 2001). As Uhrmacher (1993) states, case studies can constitute heuristic 
devices or ‘good tools for thinking with’, tools that can provide the reader with guides for 
anticipating what may be found in other situations. In this study, cross-case analysis is 
undertaken to identify common themes evident across universities within and between 
countries, and also importantly, to identify differences within and between countries. 
Themes emerging from a meta level cross-case analysis provide insights into rapidly 
evolving policies on accountability/autonomy in higher education, within a context of 
globalisation. 
Sampling involves the selection of particular countries and particular universities. As 
this research is located within a context of globalisation of education policy, more than one 
national context is highly desirable. Three different countries have been chosen – 
Singapore, HK and the PRC – to represent a continuum of policy change in the domains of 
accountability and autonomy in their respective university sectors as they reposition 
themselves in a global arena where education is the centrepiece. The discussion earlier in 
the paper on the selection of ‘Asian’ countries to begin to counterbalance the ‘Western’ 
hegemony in research on globalisation is also relevant to the purposive sampling (Punch, 
1998) of these particular three countries.  
After national policy documents on accountability/autonomy in each country were 
analysed, we chose universities that reflect different types of institutions within the sector: 
‘old/traditional’ and ‘new/technological’ universities. Two universities were purposively 
selected within each country to represent these types, although it is acknowledged that 
with any typology, ‘pure’ types rarely exist in reality, and there is often overlap between 
different categories. The case study universities are listed below with the asterisk(*) 
marking the ‘old/traditional’ universities in each country: 
  National University of Singapore* 
  Nanyang University of Technology (Singapore) 
  Hong Kong University* 
  City University of Hong Kong 
  Nanjing University* (PRC) 
  Nanjing University of Science and Technology (PRC)  
Both documentary and interview data were collected from each case study institution. It 
is the interview data from the two case study universities in China on accountability 
policies and practices which are reported in the next section.  
 
Interviews in China: Accountability 
“To be accountable, conventionally, is to be ‘held to account’, defining a relationship of 
formal control between parties, one of whom is mandatorily held to account to the other for 
the exercise of roles and stewardship of public resources” (Ranson, 2003, p. 460). Ranson 
goes on to point out that accountability is usually experienced as a specific event such as 
an annual performance appraisal, and, in theory, public trust is established through 
specifying performance and then regulating compliance. However, he emphasises the 
complex, multiple and reciprocal relationships in accountability. Currie et al. (2003) draw 
on the work of Trow (1996) and Romzek (2000) to explore different types of accountability, 
focussing particularly on the distinctions between external and internal forms and the 
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the shift from ex ante (before changes) and ex post (after changes) accountability in an era 
of globalisation. The evolving concept of accountability is explored again, in relation to the 
data obtained in this study, in the final discussion of the paper. 
This section reports on the ways in which accountability policies and practices play 
out in Chinese universities, as revealed by interviews with respondents in late 2003. The 
focus is on two case study institutions both located in Jiangsu Province – Nanjing 
University (NU) and Nanjing University of Science and Technology (NUST). These 
institutions are situated somewhat differently within the Chinese higher education system 
(1070 universities in total), as briefly sketched in the paragraphs to follow. 
Nanjing University (NU) was founded in 1902 as a comprehensive university, with a 
liberal orientation. It has very strong programs in humanities and social sciences as well as 
the natural sciences. By contrast, engineering is relatively weak, although NU is beginning 
to build engineering programs. The university has a long history and has consistently 
ranked in the top ten in China, although its rank has slipped in the last few years from third 
to sixth, and this has been the source of some concern. These rankings are conducted by 
non-government organizations but are widely published and frequently referred to.  
Nanjing University of Science and Technology (NUST) is a specialist engineering 
university, and its humanities and social sciences are relatively weak by contrast with its 
science and technology programs. NUST has a good reputation within the higher 
education system but does not have the status of NU. It originated as a military college, 
and continues to enjoy close links with the military. In the 1960s, it became a provincial 
university. NUST is not characterised by the liberal orientation evident at NU. In the year 
that the data was collected (2003) it was ranked forty-fifth. 
Most of the themes to emerge from the data were in common across the two case 
study universities, but differences between the two institutions also existed, and these are 
noted. Quotes are used extensively to allow respondents’ voices to be heard, and an audit 
trail is provided with respondents numbered and indicated as U if from Nanjing University 
(NU) and T if from Nanjing University of Science and Technology (NUST). The discussion 
of findings opens with respondents’ views about the policy push to create ‘world class 
universities’ in China, as we would argue that it is within this framework that significant 
changes to accountability policies and practices are being developed. 
 
Globalisation – creating ‘world class’ universities 
Most respondents equated globalisation with China’s policy of opening up to the world. 
Generally they viewed globalisation in positive terms, as an opportunity which, by ‘working 
hard’ and ‘working smart’, would bring many benefits, as expressed by this respondent: 
“Globalisation means being open and facing the world. It brings lots of changes in 
research and teaching to universities. The government encourages it and does not put any 
limits on it” (U2).  
In China, nine universities have been designated by the government as those that 
should strive to achieve ‘world class’ status. Two universities – Beijing and Tsinghua – are 
widely acknowledged as the leaders and they receive significantly higher levels of 
resources. In the case study universities, respondents also felt the pressure to attain ‘world 
class’ status, although respondents at NU were more optimistic that their university could 
achieve this goal than those at NUST. For example, from NU: “Nanjing University should 
and can become the best university in China and compete as a world class university” 
(U5). However, from NUST: “This university wants to be well known in the world, but this is 
ridiculous, extraordinarily inane and meaningless” (T8). 
Most respondents at NU associated globalisation with exchanges with other countries 
of teachers, and to a lesser extent students. One respondent noted that the university is 
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Yale, MIT, Oxford and Cambridge and therefore their views are really world views” (U5). 
One group of NU respondents argued that in engaging with globalisation the primary 
focus should remain on China, for example: “I think we should deal with the Chinese 
economy first, and if the outcomes promote the development of the Chinese economy, that 
is the best reward” (U6) and “the real internationalisation should be to answer China’s 
needs first” (U10). 
A significant number of respondents, especially at NUST, identified serious 
impediments to Chinese universities engaging with globalisation, in particular resources 
and language:  
 
“If the university wants to be high level in the world, it should not only serve China but 
the whole world. The language we use is Chinese but when doing international 
communication, everyone needs good English. It cannot be bought by money. 
Language is the biggest problem. The second is financial problems.” (T2) 
 
One respondent at NU turned the focus beyond finances and language to the 
curriculum: “The university does not do much on globalisation education. There needs to 
be reform of the whole curriculum and integrating internationalization into subjects. 
Globalisation does not only mean learning English” (U11). 
One key lever used to forge the government’s goal of rapidly developing ‘world class’ 
Chinese universities has been changing policies on accountability in both research and 
teaching, as explored below. All respondents noted that there was virtually no 
accountability, or reward for service, either inside or outside the university. 
 
Accountability in research 
Here respondents reported on mechanisms used by their universities and governments to 
achieve accountability in research; the rewards and sanctions applied by their universities 
and governments to enhance productivity in research; and the key contentious issues they 
identified around the theme of accountability in research. 
 
Mechanisms 
One respondent from NU succinctly explained the rationale for introducing more rigorous 
mechanisms in the assessment of research productivity in the following terms: “if a 
university wants to promote its reputation, research must be emphasised because it can 
be seen [measured]. The reputation of a university has a direct relationship to its ability to 
acquire resources” (U2). Publications and research grants are the major mechanisms for 
measuring research performance in the case study universities, and throughout China.  
In Chinese higher education, publications are ranked through a clearly defined 
hierarchy of journals. Journals in the English-speaking world are ranked at the top, with 
Science and Nature being considered the most prestigious. The second tier consists of 
other leading international journals which are seen as much more important than Chinese 
journals. Among Chinese journals there are national leading journals, although there are 
only a few in each field, and then the ‘core’ journals. At the bottom of the status hierarchy 
are provincial journals, which are often circulated nationally but are provincial based. This 
hierarchy was very well understood by respondents across both case studies, although it 
appears to be more rigorously applied at NU as it strives to achieve ‘world class’ status: 
“From 1992, our ex-principal emphasised competing within the international academy and 
our university encouraged academics to publish in overseas publications. The effect was 
immediately obvious. We led in publications for seven years in China from 1994 to 2001. 
Last year Beijing was first for the number of papers published in the Science Citation 
Index. We were second” (U3). 
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research productivity. Research grants from the national level are the most prestigious 
(and weighted more heavily), followed by provincial funds. One respondent noted that: 
“The national science fund is counted five times. So if an academic has 100 000 Yuan 
national natural science funds it is counted as Y500 000 research funds” (T8). Most 
respondents noted that research funds were playing a relatively bigger role when 
assessing productivity in recent times as ‘the market’ was assuming greater importance in 
China. NU enjoys national prestige based on publications but it has more difficulty winning 
research funds because its strengths of humanities and social sciences attract less 
industry funding  – that is, these disciplines are more distant from ‘the market’ for applied 
knowledge. By contrast, NUST receives large grants from the military for purposes such as 
weapons research. They receive enough money so that money was not seen as a problem 
at NUST.  
China has established around 160 national research laboratories to foster research 
productivity and they are forced to compete with each other to retain funding. As one 
respondent explained: “Every 5 years they will be evaluated. The evaluation is very strict. 
For example, in 2004 all chemistry laboratories will be evaluated. The last will be 
eliminated through the contest. There is a 10% rate of elimination.” (U3). 
 
Rewards and sanctions  
An elaborate system of rewards and sanctions has been developed to foster research 
productivity and thereby induce Chinese universities towards performing more 
competitively on the global scene. The majority of respondents identified the most potent 
rewards and sanctions for research grants and publications in terms of money for personal 
use by academics. In relation to research grants, one respondent noted that it is common 
for 25% of a research grant to be allocated to a personal account for private use (clothes, 
food, travel), and this explains why academics are very motivated to obtain research 
funds, especially from industry. Similarly, personal financial rewards for publications in 
prestigious English-speaking journals have been very sizeable, especially for the most 
prestigious journals such as Science and Nature. Financial incentives for publications have 
varied quite significantly between universities and also across departments within 
universities, as reflected in the case study institutions. One respondent at NUST 
explained: “If your paper is published in a core journal such as Social Sciences in China, 
some universities give Y100 000 reward but in our university the reward is only Y300” (T7). 
At NU, in one faculty: “if publishing a paper in first level periodicals the award is Y2 000, in 
the core periodicals it is Y800” (U6), but in another faculty: “an academic would be given 
Y1000 if published in that first level periodical, and for a core periodical it has just 
increased from Y200 to Y500” (U8). In general terms: “If the quality of the journal is higher, 
the money will be more” (U4). 
However, more recently, across China, this system of financial rewards for publications 
and grants is being phased out, to be replaced by ‘position allowances’ (also referred to as 
‘post allowances’), which include formalised contractual expectations of specified levels of 
research productivity (and teaching workload), with sanctions for non-compliance. One 
respondent suggested that this change may be in part because more academics were 
achieving international publications and it was becoming too expensive for institutions to 
continue to offer lucrative rewards. However, it must be recognised that still only a small 
percentage of Chinese academics publish internationally and for them the personal 
rewards (albeit a smaller percentage of their increasing salary levels) remain significant. 
Although both case study universities have adopted ‘position allowances’, the 
requirements at each level of the system are slightly lower at NUST than at NU. If an 
academic is not publishing enough, it can mean that her/his position allowance may be 
reduced by 10-20%. For example, a professor may only receive a salary at associate 
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recent and still relatively rare. 
There was almost unanimous agreement amongst respondents that the mechanisms 
for research accountability described above significantly increase the pressure on 
academics to aim to perform at a ‘world class’ level. 
 
Issues  
Key issues to emerge from respondents about accountability in research included 
concerns about quality versus quantity of publications; lack of defined journal procedures 
for assessing papers for publication (especially the impact of guan xi); dominance of 
English-speaking journals and the subsequent effect on Chinese research; the short time 
frames for measuring productivity; and discipline tensions in research performance 
indicators, as evidenced below:  
Every respondent expressed deep concerns about whether counting the number of 
publications (quantity) undermined their quality, as reflected in numerous quotes like the 
following: 
 
“Without the stimulation of money they [researchers] could do it [publish] but it is still 
OK not to. It [money] adds pressure. The negative effect is that the quality cannot be 
guaranteed. The reason why they write papers is not because they want to write. They 
are not writing ‘from the heart’. This is a negative thing.” (T5) 
 
“Actually people in China cheat. You can write it in one paper or you can write it in 
three papers. A lot of people find different ways to try to publish more.” (U12) 
 
“To pass the assessment to become a professor, one must have 6 or 8 articles, but it’s 
only the number that counts. Some famous people may only have several articles in 
their whole life but each is a milestone. Those ‘nasty’ articles are useless. It is like 
forcing a gentlewoman to be a prostitute.” (T8) 
 
“The measure for evaluating research outcomes is quantification. It is from the logic 
of science. … The spirit of the arts has been thrown away. …The advantage is that it 
is easy for leaders to do assessments. The disadvantage is that it is easy to ignore 
the quality of outcomes. But if you say pay attention to quality, how can it be 
measured?” (U11) 
 
The obsession with counting the numbers of papers academics publish is also 
problematic for postgraduate students, as indicated by respondents in both case study 
universities: “NUST students must have 3 articles before they acquire their doctoral 
degrees. Without them students cannot graduate and many require suspension for 5 or 6 
years to obtain their degree” (T8). Three papers for doctoral graduation were also required 
at NU, but in some faculties (social sciences rather than sciences) recently they have 
loosened the three paper rule. 
The lack of defined journal procedures for assessing papers for publication was a 
widespread concern for respondents. In particular, guan xi, the traditional Chinese system 
of relationship-building with those sponsors who will foster one’s career, was considered to 
undermine and corrupt any formalised mechanisms for assessing the quality of papers. 
One respondent explained: 
 
“The phenomenon of papers being published because of guan xi is very serious. In 
domestic publications if you do not know the editors, they will not even take a look. 
The process of sending a paper to several authorities in the field [peer review] is just 
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relations factor [guan xi] also mixes into it and has a dominant position.” (T7) 
 
Concerns were also raised by respondents about the observation that many Chinese 
journals only publish papers emanating from the highest ranking universities and others 
have little chance of being published, as illustrated by this example: “The main articles 
published by the Journal of Computing are from Tsinghua and Beijing [the top two ranked 
universities]. It is very difficult for other universities to be published” (T8). 
Most respondents raised the issue of the unfairness of needing to publish in English to 
gain prestige for one’s research. They noted that Chinese research agendas and priorities 
are not always welcome in international journals and therefore Chinese academics have 
difficulty obtaining publications which are deemed to be prestigious. The flow-on effect is 
that relevant localised Chinese research becomes under valued. 
Tensions between disciplines were evident over research performance indicators, as 
academics in science and technology are able to publish more in prestigious, English-
speaking, international journals than those in humanities and social sciences. Further, 
these disciplines are more likely to be able to obtain funding from industry. 
Competitive differences between disciplines also translate into competitive tensions 
between universities, as in these case study institutions where respondents at NU (with its 
emphasis on liberal arts and humanities) were more likely to be critical of the 
science/engineering style productivity measures which favoured universities such as 
NUST. There are other ways, too, in which counting publications fragments the higher 
education system and exacerbates competitive tensions, as emphasised by one 
respondent: “Originally an academic writes a paper to service academe. It is not for any 
specific university. Now it has become universities scrambling for outcomes” (T7). 
Despite concerns expressed by respondents about the types of issues identified 
above, on the whole, academics in this study were more opposed to the specific measures 
employed than the general notion of accountability for research performance, and they 
argued that the methods of assessment should be more refined. 
 
Accountability in teaching 
A significant percentage of respondents noted that both governments and academics in 
China pay relatively more attention to teaching than is often evident in other countries. 
Within Chinese culture, teachers are highly valued. Lectures remain very teacher-centred, 
although there is increasing encouragement from governments and universities to adopt 
more innovative and student-centred styles of teaching and learning. 
This section reports on respondents’ views about the mechanisms used by their 
universities and governments to achieve accountability inteaching; the rewards and 
sanctions applied by their universities and governments to enhance teaching quality; and 
the key contentious issues they identified around the theme of accountability in teaching. 
 
Mechanisms 
From the late 1990s, more systematic mechanisms for evaluating teaching performance 
were being implemented in China at the same time as research productivity was also 
being more strictly measured by governments. Yet, according to the large majority of 
respondents, despite the rhetoric of the importance of teaching, it is not valued as highly 
as research performance, and further, teaching evaluation is much more problematic than 
research evaluation. However, the apparent national and institutional priority of research 
over teaching is not uncontested by academics, as this respondent emphasised: “It is 
wrong not to pay attention to teaching if we want to be a ‘world class’ university. Teaching 
is the first thing” (U6). 
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universities. Both national and provincial governments are directly involved in teaching 
assessments. Within universities, both students and senior academics evaluate teaching 
performance. Each year since the late 1990s, the Ministry of Education (MOE) of the 
national government randomly selects a few universities for a teaching audit which 
includes teacher performance, portfolios, textbooks, student assignments, teaching 
records and examination papers. Similar teaching evaluations are also conducted by the 
provincial governments, and some cities like Shanghai also conduct their own teaching 
evaluations. The MOE does not restrict its audits to national universities, but also checks 
on provincial universities. Many respondents saw this as a reflection of the degree of 
control the MOE seeks to have over university teaching.   
Within universities, mechanisms to assure quality in teaching are relatively similar 
across different universities. Student evaluations of teaching by undergraduates occur 
every year in every unit, and the evaluations are usually conducted by a centralised office 
of educational administration. There are no systematic postgraduate teaching evaluations. 
Each lecturer receives feedback from the administration with their teaching score, which is 
made public in some universities. In addition to student evaluations, senior university 
personnel, such as faculty deans, attend lectures (usually unannounced) to make 
observations. If a teacher is deemed to be under performing, a retired or senior professor 
with a reputation for good teaching attends lectures and offers advice.  
The effect of teaching assessments was seen in negative terms by the majority of 
respondents. Further, a large percentage of respondents in both case study universities 
argued that maintaining quality in teaching had become more difficult as both workloads 
and class sizes had increased. 
At NU, the majority of respondents believed that the university had a reputation for 
quality teaching, and several acknowledged that their teaching is made easier by the 
quality of the students: “The quality of our undergraduates is very high because their 
lowest score is the same as the Beijing and Tsinghua University [the top two]” (U6). NUST 
did not attract the same level of high performing students. Respondents in both case study 
universities noted a widespread practice in China: “There is a tendency for famous 
scholars to spend some time teaching undergraduate students. The government does not 
want them to spend all their time on research because they think that undergraduates 
should have the opportunity to communicate with prestigious scholars – it’s important for 
them to develop and be successful” (U12). 
 
Rewards and sanctions 
There are both national and provincial awards for excellence in teaching. National teaching 
awards are very prestigious but are fewer and very hard to get. There is also a ‘politics’ 
involved as respondents noted that the MOE tries to balance awards to different provinces 
and universities. Teaching awards usually only involve a small amount of money for 
personal use, and respondents largely saw them as token gestures compared to rewards 
for research grants and publications. 
Sanctions for ‘poor’ teaching quality are relatively rare. At the institutional level, the 
MOE might force the university to stop recruiting students in particular programs if 
teaching is not deemed to be of a suitable standard, but this kind of sanction is fairly rare. 
For individual academics, in extreme cases, poor evaluations from students and senior 
staff could result in their removal from a teaching position to laboratory or library work, but 
this is also fairly rare. More often, if there are problems, senior university personnel 
discuss difficulties with the lecturer and put improvement strategies in place, although 
respondents noted that the specific approaches for improving teaching performance varies 
a little between universities. According to one respondent at NU “If you do not improve you 
are shown a ‘yellow card’. If there is a ‘teaching accident,’ you are shown a ‘red card’. If a 
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teaching accidents, the problem will be serious” (U5). 
As with research, accountability for teaching is changing towards a system of penalty 
for ‘poor’ performance rather than reward for ‘good’ performance. Some respondents 
believe that if a teacher scores poorly on student evaluations and ‘peer’ observation, this 
will be reported to the faculty and that teacher is likely to have his/her position allowance 
reduced by 10-20%. Also as with research, respondents did not have a very clear 
understanding of how readily such sanctions are put into practice, given the relative 
newness of this reform. 
 
Issues  
Key issues amongst respondents about teaching performance measures included the 
effect of guan xi (relationship building); the difficulty of defining and measuring ‘good’ 
teaching; the pressure from public shaming of  teachers deemed to be ‘poor’; and the lack 
of quality control over postgraduate teaching/supervision.  
For many respondents, there was no apparent relationship between teaching scores 
on formal evaluations (from students and academic ‘peers’) and rewards for good 
teaching, such as promotion. Again guan xi, where powerful sponsors  can ‘make or break’ 
an academic career, was seen to significantly interfere with any attempts to render 
teaching assessment procedures transparent. For example, one respondent noted that 
recognition and promotion on the basis of teaching quality “It depends on how an 
academic builds relationships with the leaders. This is a very corrupt phenomenon” (T7). 
However, the phenomenon of guan xi in teaching assessments was mentioned much less 
explicitly and less often at NU than at NUST. 
Notwithstanding the phenomenon of guan xi, the difficulty of defining and measuring 
‘good’ teaching was raised as an issue by most respondents. Compared to research there 
were very negative reactions toward teaching evaluation mechanisms, but most 
respondents did maintain that some form of teaching evaluation is important. The validity 
and reliability of measurement instruments were in question, as well as the seriousness 
with which students and academic colleagues completed check lists of teacher 
competencies, as reflected in these quotes:  
 
“The university asks students to tick the boxes. … There are dozen of items to tick. I do 
not think that students take it seriously. Some of them are very impatient and do it 
carelessly. It is hard to see the extent of credibility it has.” (T8)  
 
“We [academics] observe each other. Some teachers are very busy and they have no 
time to go [to the classes of colleagues]; what they do is ticking without observation 
and hand it in.” (T8) 
 
A number of respondents commented on the pressure resulting from the public 
‘shaming’ of teachers deemed to be of ‘poor’ quality. For example at NUST: “The scores 
given by students will be released in public every year, therefore teachers feel more 
pressure” (T6) and “ If students always give low marks then old teachers will listen to the 
lesson, and then everyone knows your teaching has problems” (T6). Even at NU where 
teaching evaluation scores are not publicly available: “For a teacher who does not teach 
well, firstly the teacher will feel embarrassed. Students would go to the educational 
administration office and say that if next term the subject is still taught by this teacher, they 
would not attend class. It is invisible pressure but stronger than visible pressure” (U10). 
This quote points to the importance of dignity and ‘face’ amongst Chinese academics.  
The lack of quality control over postgraduate supervision was identified as an issue by 
most respondents. Postgraduate supervision is seen as research, not as teaching, so this 
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the supervisor and student is considered to be ‘like family’ and therefore student 
complaints about supervisors are rare, although they will complain in private, but not in 
public.” (U10). 
 
Concluding discussion 
The first part of this concluding discussion raises key themes emerging from the China 
data and the second moves to more general conceptual themes. 
Focusing first on the ‘case’ of Chinese higher education, there is clear empirical 
evidence from this study that the policy elite has actively and enthusiastically engaged with 
globalisation agendas, rapidly adopting the ideological dimension of globalisation to move 
towards market principles in the governance of the university sector. However, the 
Chinese goal of ‘world class’ universities is problematic for many, and it requires closer 
examination, especially as it appears to be related to a more limited ‘gold standard’ based 
on elite American universities (see also Marginson, 2003). Although there was widespread 
support from academic respondents in this study for the replacement of ‘closed door’ 
politics-oriented policies with market-oriented policies designed to enhance global 
engagement, the particular market mechanism adopted were heavily criticised by a large 
majority. Overall, competition, as the centrepiece of a market ideology, is becoming a 
primary modus operandus of the sector. However, the state does not appear to have rolled 
back in this new climate of marketisation, but arguably it has repositioned itself as ‘market 
manager’, steering via different mechanisms than in the past, but steering strongly all the 
same. It is through an elaborate, highly prescribed system of accountability mechanisms, 
in both research and teaching, that tight steerage of academic work has been maintained, 
and even augmented, on the assumption that it will serve the national interest. 
Increasingly in Chinese higher education, academics are being held responsible for their 
productivity in research and teaching through a form of contractual accountability, as they 
must achieve a certain quantity of publications and teaching workload which is tied 
specifically to their ‘position allowance’ and appraised annually. With additional rewards for 
publication in prestigious journals (and to a lesser extent for teaching excellence) in the 
form of personal monetary incentives, performance related pay has been a significant 
driver to rapidly embed a culture of performativity. For almost all respondents 
accountability mechanisms in research were accepted more readily than in teaching where 
measurement of performance was seen as more problematic. Even so, the apparent 
obsession with counting publications in a clearly defined hierarchy of journals, has brought 
deep concerns from almost all respondents about the valuing of quantity over quality. 
Further, the privileging of publications in English has brought deep concerns about 
preserving ‘local’ Chinese research and culture, especially in the social sciences, in the 
often overwhelming race to engage globally. 
To further complicate accountability relationships in Chinese higher education, the 
newer, corporate, ‘Western’ managerial and market accountability mechanisms are 
layered on top of a more traditional accountability in the form of guan xi  (relationship 
building with senior sponsors). Those who support the new market principles and accept 
new accountability regimes as more transparent, see guan xi as playing a corrupt role in 
the new system. These modified ‘Western’ and traditional modes of accountability operate 
under different sets of rules and the two are in constant tension, according to an 
overwhelming number of respondents. Thus, ‘new’ accountabilities have not replaced the 
‘old’ ones, but they have coalesced into what, arguably, is an unstable hybrid of 
accountability relationships. Hence, while the Chinese national government has clearly set 
a path towards active participation on the global stage, there has been, and will continue to 
be, a need to navigate ‘the local’ within ‘the global’, especially in higher education which 
has been ascribed a central position in the global knowledge economy. 
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including quality assurance, is one of the major education policy domains which has grown 
to prominence with globalising new times. Accountability policies sit as the ‘flip side’ of 
policies which feature the rhetoric of devolution, decentralisation and deregulation. 
Together they operationalise a neo-liberal ideology in education, in what one respondent 
in this study colourfully referred to as ‘dancing in shackles’ to illustrate the characteristic 
‘loose-tight coupling’ or ‘steering at a distance’. Despite the multiple and complex 
accountability relationships, many commentators have observed a strong transition 
towards market and managerial forms of accountability accompanying the ideological shift 
which privileges economic discourses (e.g. Ball, Vincent and Radnor, 1997). Ranson 
(2003) also identifies this shift in the neo-liberal age and maintains that these new 
accountabilities have a more punitive connotation and, consequently, they undermine the 
agency of professionals. He identifies the emergence of consumer, contract, performative 
and corporate forms of accountability over the last 25 years. As an alternative, Ranson 
proposes a democratic accountability where an inclusive democratic community actively 
participates in the deliberation over their differences to form a judgement about what is to 
be done. He believes that this process will lead to the return of public accountability – a 
consent of society – which must be continually tested and reaffirmed. He argues that neo-
liberal accountabilities have actually displaced the public it was meant to serve and that 
trust can only be restored through the framework of public accountability that he describes. 
Olssen et al. (2004) also pick up on the concept of trust which they, too, maintain has 
been eroded with neo-liberal accountability practices of monitoring, reporting, recording 
and surveillance. As with many other writers in the field, they distinguish external low trust 
accountability based on line management from internal high trust accountability based on 
professional responsibility,  and they argue for a rejuvenation of the latter to foster 
democratic society. We would argue that given the existence of multiple and complex 
accountabilities in higher education, an hybridisation of different forms of accountability 
has a greater potential to empower a more diverse range of interest groups and individuals 
than any one form alone. To dislodge the hegemony of neo-liberal accountabilities, and 
create space for more professional and democratic forms involves the uncoupling of the  
technical and the ideological dimensions of globalisation, so that other (non-economic) 
possibilities for solutions to higher education public policy issues (and public policy 
generally) might emerge. The negotiation of the particular nature of the hybrid is of course 
not likely to be a straight forward process, and the dynamics will vary in the different 
contexts of different higher education systems. What is appropriate in various ‘Western’ 
countries may not be as relevant in the countries in our current study, for example. 
This point about context specific differences returns us to our starting point of the 
complex, contested and often contradictory processes of globalisation. For us, the concept 
of ‘globalisation’, when it implies policy homogenisation, is too blunt an instrument to 
critically analyse these major reforms. Further, we would like to see more work done on 
the mechanisms of policy transfer between and within different countries, including amore 
detailed examination of the role of supranational organizations, international policy 
networks and possible global policy communities, in a context of globalisation.  We would 
argue that there are still too few studies on globalisation processes grounded in detailed 
examinations of particular historical times and geographical spaces. We anticipate that as 
our project in PRC, HK and Singapore continues we might be able to shed more light on 
these issues– both empirically and theoretically. 
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